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CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW, 
FEDERAL COMMON LAW, AND FEDERAL 
COURT JURISDICTION 
Gwynne Skinner∗ 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
One question that remains unresolved in our federal judicial system 
is whether federal courts have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331, 
the general federal question jurisdictional statute, to recognize private 
claims for violations of customary international law as a matter of federal 
common law; in other words, whether such private claims arise “under 
the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States.”1  A threshold 
inquiry to this question is whether claims for violations of customary 
international law “arise under the Constitution or laws of the United 
States” for purposes of Article III of the United States Constitution,2 
which sets forth the constitutional outer limits of federal court 
jurisdiction that Congress is entitled to grant.3  These questions largely 
depend upon the status of customary international law in United States 
domestic law and particularly, federal common law.  These issues are 
unsettled and continue to be the subject of contentious scholarly debate. 
This essay addresses federal common law’s proper recognition of 
customary international law and the implications of that recognition for 
jurisdiction under § 1331.  In the author’s view, customary international 
law itself is not wholly incorporated into federal law; rather, federal 
courts have common law power to incorporate rules of customary 
international law when developing federal common law in areas of 
federal interest, including in cases that might impact foreign affairs.  In 
this way, it is federal common law, not customary international law 
                                                 
∗ Assistant Professor of Clinical Law, Willamette University College of Law, Salem, 
Oregon.  M.St., International Human Rights Law (LL.M equiv), Oxford University, with 
Distinction; J.D., University of Iowa, with High Distinction; M.A., University of Iowa; B.A., 
University of Northern Iowa, with Highest Honors.  This essay is an expanded version of 
remarks presented at the Conference on the Application of International Law in the 
Domestic Context, Valparaiso University School of Law, Valparaiso, Indiana, April 3, 2009.  
It outlines ideas to be further developed in a later article. 
1 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (2006).  The statute reads, “The district courts shall have original 
jurisdiction of all civil actions arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United 
States.”  The statute was enacted in 1875.  Act of Mar. 3, 1875, ch. 137, 18 Stat. 
2 28 U.S.C. § 1331; U.S. CONST. art. III. 
3 Article III, section 2, provides nine different categories to which federal judicial power 
extends, including “all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under this Constitution, the Laws 
of the United States, and Treaties made, or which shall be made, under their Authority.” 
U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 2. 
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itself, that is the “law of the United States” for purposes of Article III and 
28 U.S.C. § 1331.  Similarly, federal courts have the authority to recognize 
claims for violations of customary international law as part of this 
common law power. 
A. The Alien Tort Statute and Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain 
A different jurisdictional statute enacted in 1789 as part of the First 
Judiciary Act, the Alien Tort Statute4 (“ATS”), provides federal courts 
with jurisdiction over tort claims brought by aliens for violations of the 
“law of nations,” a term typically equated with customary international 
law.5  In the 2004 case of Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain,6 the U.S. Supreme 
Court found that the ATS is a jurisdictional statute that does not itself 
create a cause of action, but that federal courts can recognize aliens’ 
private claims for a limited set of violations of the law of nations7 as a 
matter of federal common law.8  In other words, it is federal common 
law that provides the cause of action for certain international law 
violations.9 
The Court found that federal courts can use their common law 
power to recognize these private claims in the absence of a federal 
statute authorizing such claims on the basis that Congress enacted the 
ATS in 1789 with an understanding “that courts would exercise 
jurisdiction by entertaining some common law claims derived from the 
law of nations.”10  The Court’s finding that Congress authorized a 
private cause of action based on congressional understanding is not new 
or radical; the Court has found implicit congressional authorization of 
                                                 
4 28 U.S.C. § 1350, enacted as Section 9 of the Judiciary Act of 1789 (also referred to as 
the First Judiciary Act), 1 Stat. 73, 76–77 (1789).  The statue reads, “[t]he district courts shall 
have original jurisdiction of any civil action by an alien for a tort only, committed in 
violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the United States.”  Id. 
5 The Estrella, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat) 298, 307 (1819) (referring to non-treaty-based law of 
nations as the “the customary . . . law of nations”); Flores v. S. Peru Copper Corp., 414 F.3d 
233, 237 n.2 (2d Cir. 2003).  From this point on, the term “law of nations” will be used to 
reference customary international law, and the terms will be used interchangeably. 
6 542 U.S. 692 (2004). 
7 Id. at 725.  The Court held that any claim brought today for a violation of the law of 
nations under the ATS must “rest on a norm of international character accepted by the 
civilized world and defined with a specificity comparable to the features of the 18th-
century paradigms” recognized at the time—attacks on diplomats, safe conducts, and 
piracy.  Id. 
8 Id. at 714, 724, 725. 
9 Id. at 724 (“The jurisdictional grant is best read as having been enacted on the 
understanding that the common law would provide a cause of action for the modest 
number of international law violations with a potential for personal liability at the time.”). 
10 Id. at 714, 724, 731 n.19. 
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private causes of action on several occasions where Congress assumed 
such actions were available or where private claims had been allowed 
prior to a statutory enactment.11 
Specifically regarding the role of the law of nations in federal law, 
the Court stated that “[f]or two centuries we have affirmed that the 
domestic law of the United States recognizes the law of nations.”12  The 
Court cited several cases stating that, in appropriate circumstances, 
federal courts have applied international law as part of federal law.13  
However, the Court refrained from describing its views on the exact role 
of customary international law within federal law and does not appear to 
have advocated for the wholesale incorporation of customary 
international law into federal common law.  But the Court clearly 
indicated that federal common law can provide a cause of action for at 
least some violations of customary international law. 
In response to Justice Scalia’s concurring opinion that the Court’s 
decision would lead to “arising under” federal question jurisdiction 
pursuant to § 1331 for claims of customary international law violations,14 
the Court stated, “[o]ur position does not . . . imply that every grant of 
jurisdiction to a federal court carries with it an opportunity to develop 
common law (so that the grant of federal-question jurisdiction would be 
equally as good for our purposes of § 1350).”15  The Court explained that 
the ATS was “enacted on the congressional understanding that courts 
would exercise jurisdiction by entertaining some common law claims 
derived from the law of nations; and we know of no reason to think that 
federal-question jurisdiction was extended subject to any comparable 
congressional assumption.”16  Moreover, although the Court opined that 
“no development in the two centuries . . . has categorically precluded 
federal courts from recognizing a claim under the law of nations as an 
element of common law[,]”17 it also stated that its opinion was consistent 
with the division of responsibilities between federal and state courts 
after Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins18 whereas “a more expansive common law 
power related to 28 U.S.C. § 1331 might not be.”19 
                                                 
11 See, e.g., Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375, 380 (1983); Merrill Lynch, 
Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Curran, 456 U.S. 353, 380 (1982). 
12 Sosa, 542 U.S. at 729. 
13 Id. at 729–30 (internal citations omitted). 
14 Id. at 745. 
15 Id. at 731 n.19. 
16 Id.  
17 Id. at 724–25. 
18 304 U.S. 64 (1938). 
19 Sosa, 542 U.S. at 731 n.19. 
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Thus, in Sosa, although the Court did not decisively settle the 
question of whether claims for violation of customary international law 
could be brought under § 1331, it did indicate a skepticism about such 
claims.  This means that while non-citizens may bring such claims under 
the ATS, citizens might not be able to do so under general federal 
question jurisdiction. 
Finally, the Sosa Court did not address whether claims for violation 
of the law of nations under the ATS arise “under the Constitution or 
Laws of the United States” for purposes of Article III.  The issue was not 
raised nor briefed, so the Court did not have occasion to consider it 
directly. 
There are no Article III concerns when an ATS case is between an 
alien and a citizen because in that situation Article III’s alienage 
provision provides for clear Article III constitutionality.20  However, 
when the case is between two aliens, as it was in Sosa (both were 
Mexican citizens), federal courts can exercise ATS jurisdiction under 
Article III only if the claims meet the “arising under the Constitution or 
Laws of the United States” provision.  The Court, however, was silent as 
to whether the ATS was constitutional between two aliens.  Moreover, 
the Supreme Court let stand the holding in the ground-breaking 1980 
Second Circuit ATS case, Filartiga v. Pena-Irala,21 which determined that 
the ATS was constitutional based on the “laws of the United States” 
provision of Article III, and cited Filartiga approvingly for other 
propositions.22  This silence on the ATS’s constitutionality and the 
Court’s approval of Filartiga, combined with the Court’s statement that 
“[f]or two centuries we have affirmed that the domestic law of the 
United States recognizes the law of nations[,]”23 creates a fair assumption 
that the Supreme Court most likely agrees that the ATS is constitutional 
because the law of nations, or at least federal common law that 
incorporates certain rules of the law of nations, is part of the “laws of the 
United States” for purposes of Article III. 
It should also be noted that the Supreme Court has never clearly 
stated that federal common law can be the basis of “laws of the United 
States” under Article III.  However, the Court in Illinois v. City of 
Milwaukee clearly stated that federal common law could be the basis for 
                                                 
20 U.S. CONST. art. III § 2, cl. 2.  Article III also provides for federal judicial power when a 
case is between citizens of a state and citizens of a foreign state.  Id.  Thus, for a case 
between two aliens to be constitutional under Article III, the case must arise under the 
Constitution or laws of the United States.  Id. 
21 630 F.2d 876, 885 (2d Cir. 1980). 
22 Sosa, 542 U.S. at 725, 731–32. 
23 Id. at 729. 
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§ 1331 jurisdiction.24  Illinois v. City of Milwaukee does not directly address 
whether federal common law can be the basis for Article III’s “arising 
under” provision.  However, some commentators have argued that the 
opinion, as well as two dissenting opinions by Justice Brennan, leads to 
this conclusion.25  The fact that the Court has found § 1331 jurisdiction 
narrower than the jurisdiction provided for in Article III26 strengthens 
this view.  Thus, if the federal common law can provide for arising under 
jurisdiction pursuant to § 1331, it almost necessarily means that it 
provides for jurisdiction under Article III as well. 
II.  CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW AS FEDERAL COMMON LAW, AND 
THUS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES 
A. The Role of Customary International Law in the U.S. Domestic Legal 
System 
1. The Current Debate 
Although federal courts are nearly uniform in their consensus that 
customary international law is “part of the federal common law[,]”27 
scholars disagree about the precise role of international law in the U.S. 
domestic legal system.  The Court in Sosa agreed that certain customary 
international law norms are actionable through federal common law 
claims; however, it did not specify its views about the exact role of 
customary international law in our federal judicial system, indicating 
only that “domestic law of the United States recognizes the law of 
nations.”28 
Two predominate camps have emerged regarding the role of 
customary international law in the domestic law of the United States:  
                                                 
24 Illinois v. City of Milwaukee, 406 U.S. 91, 100 (1972) (citing Romero v. Int’l Terminal 
Operating Co., 358 U.S. 354, 393 (1959) (concluding that “laws” within the meaning of 
§ 1331 embraced claims founded on federal common law)).  In the case, Illinois filed a 
lawsuit against four cities alleging that they were polluting Lake Michigan and creating a 
public nuisance, and asked the lower courts to abate the nuisance.  Id. at 93. 
25 See, e.g., Section 301(a) and the Federal Common Law of Labor Agreements, 75 YALE L.J. 877, 
886 n.9 (1966); Jack I. Garvey, Repression of the Political Émigré-The Underground to 
International Law:  A Proposal for Remedy, 90 YALE L.J. 78, 97 (1980). 
26 See, e.g., Verlinden B.V. v. Cent. Bank of Nig., 461 U.S. 480, 495 (1983); Powell v. 
McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 515–16 (1969).  See also Donald L. Doernberg, There’s No Reason 
For It; It’s Just Our Policy:  Why the Well Pleaded Complaint Rule Sabotages the Purposes of 
Federal Question Jurisdiction, 38 HASTINGS L.J. 597, 608 (1987). 
27 Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 885 (2d Cir. 1980).  See Sosa, 542 U.S. at 729; see also 
infra text accompanying notes 60–68.  In addition, the RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN 
RELATIONS, 111 cmt. D states that “[c]ustomary international law is considered to be like 
common law in the United States, but it is federal law.”   
28 Sosa, 542 U.S. at 729 (emphasis added). 
Skinner: Customary International Law, Federal Common Law, and Federal Cour
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2010
830 VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 44 
those who advocate the so-called “modern” position and those that 
advocate the self-described “revisionist” position.  Although there are 
nuances between various scholars who advocate similar positions, 
generally, the view of the modernists is that federal law incorporates 
customary international law, either wholesale or in part, depending on 
the scholar.29  Most modernists argue that while customary international 
law was general common law early in our country’s history (because the 
concept of federal common law did not exist at the time), customary 
international law became incorporated into federal common law as 
federal common law began to fully develop, emerging as a clear enclave 
of federal common law after Erie.30  The modernists do not believe that 
Congress needs to specifically authorize the federal courts to incorporate 
customary international law because federal courts have common law 
power to incorporate customary international law themselves.31 
The revisionist position is that federal common law does not 
incorporate customary international law and that since Erie, it can only 
become part of federal common law when Congress specifically 
authorizes its incorporation.32  Like the more recent modernists, they 
generally agree that, historically, the law of nations was part of the 
general common law, but they do not believe that the law of nations ever 
became part of federal common law.33  To the degree it did, they argue 
Erie ended the ability of federal courts to incorporate customary 
international law without specific congressional authorization.34 
Professors Curtis Bradley and Jack Goldsmith are probably the best 
known “revisionists” who discount the “modern position” that the law 
of nations is part of our federal common law without the need for any 
                                                 
29 Lea Brilmayer, Federalism, State Authority, and the Preemptive Power of International Law, 
1994 SUP. CT. REV. 295, 295; William R. Casto, The New Federal Common Law of Tort Remedies 
for Violations of International Law, 37 RUTGERS L.J. 635 (2006); William S. Dodge, Bridging 
Erie:  Customary International Law in the U.S. Legal System after Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 12 
TULSA J. COMP. & INT’L L. 87 (2004); Ryan Goodman & Derek P. Jink, Filartiga’s Firm 
Footing:  International Human Rights and Federal Common Law, 66 FORDHAM L. REV. 463, 472 
(1997); Harold Hongju Koh, Is International Law Really State Law?, 111 HARV. L. REV. 1824, 
1825 (1998);  Beth Stephens, The Law of Our Land:  Customary International Law as Federal Law 
After Erie, 66 FORDHAM L. REV. 393, 435–36 (1997). 
30 See, e.g., Goodman & Jink, supra note 29, at 471–72; Stephens, The Law of Our Land, 
supra note 29. 
31 Goodman & Jink, supra note 29, at 471–72. 
32 See, e.g., Curtis A. Bradley, The Status of Customary International Law in U.S. Courts—
Before and After Erie, 26 DENV. J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 807 (1998); Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. 
Goldsmith, Customary International Law as Federal Common Law:  A Critique of the Modern 
Position, 110 HARV. L. REV. 815 (1997). 
33 Bradley & Goldsmith, Customary International Law as Federal Common Law, supra note 
32. 
34 Id. 
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particular legislative act.  After Sosa, they wrote an article that appeared 
in the 2007 Harvard Law Review, arguing that the Sosa Court aligned 
with their views by holding that the legislative or executive branch must 
authorize federal courts to apply customary international law before the 
courts can do so, and that the ATS provides the requisite authorization, 
albeit on a limited basis.35  Other scholars have been very critical of this 
position, finding that Sosa did no such thing but in fact held the 
opposite—that courts do not need specific authorization to apply 
customary international law.36  This is in accordance with my own views.  
Congress, through the ATS, authorized the federal courts to recognize 
private claims for violations of the law of nations as a matter of common 
law rather than the authorization to apply customary international law 
as domestic law. 
I take this position because during and after the ATS enactment in 
1789, federal and state courts were already applying customary 
international law when appropriate when they otherwise had 
jurisdiction over cases, and often recognized private claims for such 
violations.37  The ATS simply gave the federal courts jurisdiction, 
concurrent with the state, over these claims.  The authorization that took 
place with the enactment of the ATS was the authorization to recognize 
certain private causes of action, which occurred through Congress’s 
understanding that courts would exercise their common law power to 
recognize these claims.  In addition, the idea that the ATS served as 
authorization for incorporation of customary international law by federal 
courts does not comport with the understanding of the time; namely, 
that the law of nations was already a part of the common law, something 
Bradley agrees with.38 
The debate concerning whether customary international law is part 
of federal law also implicates the constitutionality of the ATS under 
Article III, given that claims between two aliens are only constitutional if 
the case arises under the Constitution or laws of the United States.  
Revisionists, such as Professor Bradley, have argued that the ATS falls 
under Article III’s alienage jurisdiction and not Article III’s “arising 
                                                 
35 Curtis A. Bradley, Jack L. Goldsmith & David H. Moore, Sosa, Customary International 
Law, and the Continuing Relevance of Erie, 120 HARV. L. REV. 869, 873, 894 (2007). 
36 Beth Stephens, Sosa, the Federal Common Law and Customary International Law:  
Reaffirming the Federal Courts’ Power, 101 AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. PROC. 261, 269 (2007). 
37 See infra text accompanying notes 59–63; see also infra notes 59, 63. 
38 Bradley, The Status of Customary International Law in U.S. Courts, supra note 32, at 812; 
Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 32, at 824. 
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under” provisions.39  Modernists take the opposite position, agreeing 
with the Second Circuit in its ground-breaking ATS case, Filartiga v. 
Pena-Irala,40 that claims arising under the law of nations arise under the 
“laws of the United States” for purposes of Article III jurisdiction.41 
a. Debate Regarding Historic Role of Customary International Law Within 
the United States  
Scholars on both sides of the debate widely agree that during the late 
1700s and throughout most of the 1800s, the law of nations was 
considered general common law, applied by both federal and state 
courts in cases before them.42  The concept of federal common law had 
not yet taken hold, and a recognizable federal common law did not start 
emerging until the latter 1800s.43  As the Court in Sosa confirmed, the 
domestic law of the United States “recognized” the law of nations in 
1789 because it was seen as a type of common law that transcended each 
individual state, as well as being obligatory within each state.44 
One area of disagreement is whether the “law of the United States[,]” 
as that term is used in Article III, was meant to include the law of 
nations.  As reflected in earlier discussion, this has two main 
implications:  (1) whether the ATS is constitutional as applied to cases 
where the defendant is a non-citizen; and (2) whether there is general 
federal jurisdiction over any claim alleging the law of nations.  The 
reason it is such a complicated question is because federal common law, 
at least as we know it today, did not exist at the time the United States 
was founded.  Thus, the founders would not have perceived federal 
common law as the “law of the United States” as most courts do today.  
If customary international law is incorporated through federal common 
law, this presents an obvious problem to any sort of historical analysis. 
Professor William Dodge, citing numerous documents, including 
some of the Federalist Papers, has made the argument that, at the time of 
the United States’ founding, Congress viewed the law of nations as law 
                                                 
39 Curtis A. Bradley, The Alien Tort Statue and Article III, 42 VA. J. INT’L L. 587, 590–92 
(2002).  See also Thomas H. Lee, The Safe-Conduct Theory of the Alien Tort Statute, 106 COLUM. 
L. REV. 830, 835–40 (2006). 
40 630 F.2d 876, 885 (2d Cir. 1980). 
41 See, e.g., Dodge, Bridging Erie, supra note 29, at 102; Goodman & Jink, supra note 29, at 
475; Louis Henkin, International Law as Law in the United States, 82 MICH. L. REV. 1555, 1559–
60 (1984). 
42 Stewart Jay, Origins of Federal Common Law:  Part Two, 133 U. PA. L. REV. 1231, 1266, 
1270 (1985); Stephens, supra note 29, at 410, 430–31.  See also Bradley, The Alien Tort Statute 
and Article III, supra note 39, at 595. 
43 Stephens, supra note 29, at 410, 430–31. 
44 Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 725 (2004). 
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of the United States, albeit not through what we now conceive of as 
federal common law, for purposes of Article III.45  He also makes much 
of the difference in language between Article III and the Supremacy 
Clause of Article VI, noting that the latter refers to “[t]his Constitution, 
and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in Pursuance 
thereof[,]” whereas the former only discusses “laws of the United States” 
without reference to “pursuance thereof.”46  He argues this was likely 
intentional, and that the Constitutional Convention deliberately struck 
the words “passed by the Legislature” from the proposed text of Article 
III reported by the Committee of Detail.47  He suggests that there must be 
a category of laws that are not made “in pursuance” of the Constitution 
and yet are still “laws of the United States.”48  The most obvious 
candidate, he suggests, is the law of nations.49  Another leading scholar 
opines that the founders and early jurists believed that “all of the 
common law pertinent to the enforcement of the law of nations naturally 
attached to the federal government upon its creation.”50  Other scholars, 
particularly those in the revisionist camp, argue that the law of nations 
was part of the general common law and was not “law of the United 
States” for purposes of Article III.51 
To be sure, compelling evidence exists to support both sides of this 
debate, leading me to believe that there is no clear answer to the inquiry 
regarding whether the founders or early jurists as a group saw the law of 
nations as part of the “law of the United States” or not.  Rather, based on 
my discussion below, it is likely that some did and some did not, leading 
to no clear consensus.  In fact, the debate we see today likely existed 
throughout the late 1700s and 1800s among judges and lawyers.  This is 
exemplified in the case I discuss later, Caperton v. Bowyer.52  Much of this 
discussion was driven by the continuous debate about the power of the 
federal government vis-à-vis the states. 
There is much to support the contention that early jurists and 
lawmakers viewed the law of nations as law of the United States, even 
for purposes of Article III.  Many of the arguments are laid out in the 
                                                 
45 William S. Dodge, The Constitutionality of the Alien Tort Statute:  Some Observations on 
Text and Context, 42 VA. J. INT’L L. 687, 705–08 (2002). 
46 Id. at 704. 
47 Dodge, Bridging Erie, supra note 29, at 102. 
48 Dodge, The Constitutionality of the Alien Tort Statute, supra note 45, at 705. 
49 Id. 
50 WILLIAM R. CASTO, THE SUPREME COURT IN THE EARLY REPUBLIC:  THE CHIEF 
JUSTICESHIPS OF JOHN JAY AND OLIVER ELLSWORTH 160 (1995). 
51 See, e.g., Bradley, The Status of Customary International Law in U.S. Courts, supra note 32, 
at 812; Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 32, at 823; Bradley, Goldsmith & Moore, supra note 
35, at 875. 
52 81 U.S. (14 Wall.) 216 (1871).  See infra notes 64–68 and accompanying text. 
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article by William Dodge and others, as discussed above.  In addition, 
early federal prosecutions of federal common law crimes demonstrate 
that many of the founders viewed the law of nations as part of the 
common law of the United States and exclusive to the federal judiciary.  
In the late 1700s and into the early 1800s, the federal government 
prosecuted citizens for violations of the law of nations (such as for 
piracy, crimes on the high seas, breaches of neutrality and attacks on 
diplomats) as part of the common law of the United States.53  In these 
cases, courts routinely stated that the law of nations was part of the law 
of the United States.54  These prosecutions came to an end in 181255 as 
criticism grew against the idea of federal common law crimes not being 
defined by statute.  The criticism, however, was largely based on the 
concern that federal common law crimes provided Congress with 
unlimited power over the states, and not so much on prosecutions of the 
law of nations as part of federal law.56 
In addition, in a series of Attorney General Opinions throughout the 
1800s—specifically in 1822, 1855, and 1865—the executive branch stated 
that the law of nations was part of the law of the United States.57  
However, these statements were likely a reflection of the fact that 
questions involving the law of nations during that period typically arose 
in cases over which the federal courts already had sole jurisdiction on 
some other basis—admiralty, prize, attacks on diplomats, and the like.  
Thus, the fact that the law of nations was said to be the “law of the 
United States” only demonstrates that federal courts applied the law of 
nations to cases already otherwise before them. 
Of course, given the fact that general federal question jurisdiction 
had not yet been enacted,58 this tells us nothing about whether federal 
courts in the 1700s and 1800s actually believed that the law of nations 
was the law of the United States for purposes of jurisdiction under 
Article III.  The exception to this might be the federal common law crime 
prosecutions.   
In addition, as I have written elsewhere, federal cases (including, but 
not limited to those early federal common law prosecution cases) 
                                                 
53 Id. at 136–38.  See, e.g., Henfield’s Case, 11 F. Cas. 1099 (C.C.D. Pa. 1793). 
54 CASTO, supra note 50, at 1311; Henfield’s Case, 11 F. Cas. at 1117 (stating that because 
the law of nations is part of the common law of the United States, Henfield and others like 
him are subject to common law prosecution in federal court). 
55 United States v. Hudson & Goodwin, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 32, 34 (1812). 
56 CASTO, supra note 50, at 135, 149–50, 160. 
57 11 Op. Att’y Gen. 297, 299 (1865); 7 Op. Att’y Gen. 495, 503 (1855); 1 Op. Att’y Gen. 
566, 570 (1822). 
58 General federal question jurisdiction was not enacted until 1875.  Act of Mar. 3, 1875, 
Ch. 137, 18 Stat. 
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throughout the 1800s applied the law of nations to cases, often stating 
that the law of nations is part of the law of the United States.59  For 
example, the Supreme Court in the 1815 case of The Nereide, stated “the 
Court is bound by the law of nations which is part of the law of the 
land.”60 
Although perhaps too far removed temporally to provide insight 
into the minds of the founders, cases throughout the 1800s continued to 
refer to the “law of nations” as the law of the United States.  For 
example, in 1855, the Court in Jecker, Torre & Co. v. Montgomery61 also 
confirmed that the law of nations was part of the domestic law of the 
United States when it used its common law power to derive a rule from 
the law of nations for a prize case. 
Perhaps the most famous case that discussed the law of nations as 
part of “our law,” was the 1899 case of The Paquete Habana, which stated, 
“[i]nternational law is part of our law, and must be ascertained and 
administered by the courts of justice of appropriate jurisdiction as often 
as questions of right depending upon it are duly presented for their 
determination.”62 
These statements that the law of nations is part of United States law, 
however, do not definitively suggest that the early jurists saw the law of 
nations as jurisdiction-creating for purposes of Article III.  Rather, they 
are an indication that when the courts otherwise had jurisdiction, they 
could apply the law of nations without any specific authority from 
Congress to do so.  Moreover, state courts throughout the 1800s also 
applied various rules of the law of nations to appropriate cases before 
them, typically tort cases arising out of war.63  Although these cases often 
do not employ the similar phrase that “the law of nations is part of the 
law of the United States,” their application of the law of nations indicates 
that, like the federal courts, they too believed they could apply the law of 
nations to cases already appropriately before them.  This is consistent 
with the view that the law of nations was simply part of the general 
common law, applied by courts in appropriate circumstances when they 
otherwise had jurisdiction, just as stated by the Supreme Court in 
Paquette Habana. 
The first time that the Supreme Court heard arguments about 
whether the law of nations was the “law of the United States” for 
                                                 
59 See Gwynne Skinner, Federal Jurisdiction over U.S. Citizens’ Claims for Violations of the 
Law of Nations in Light of Sosa, 37 GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 53, 102–07 (2008). 
60 13 U.S. (9 Cranch) 388, 423(1815). 
61 59 U.S. (18 How.) 110, 112 (1855). 
62 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900). 
63 See Skinner, supra note 59, at 107–09. 
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purposes of jurisdiction was in 1871, nearly one hundred years after the 
enactment of Article III.  In the case of Caperton v. Bowyer,64 the Supreme 
Court was asked to decide whether international law, and in particular 
the law of war, was included in the “law of the United States[,]” thus 
presenting a federal question for purposes of the Court’s appellate 
review.65  Although the Court ultimately refrained from deciding the 
issue, both parties set forth strong views on the matter.  The defendant 
was a confederate provost-marshal, who had raised defenses under the 
law of war when he was sued in tort by a man he had thrown into prison 
during the Civil War (Bowyer).  He vehemently argued that his defenses 
to the suit under the laws of war gave rise to the Court’s appellate 
jurisdiction because “international law is a law of the United States, of 
the nation, and not of the several states.”66  The defendant argued that 
“[t]his indeed must be the law, or the General Government is at the 
mercy, on a question of foreign relations, of the action of a State, or of its 
courts.”67 
The plaintiff argued that the defenses, even if based on international 
law, did not provide the Court with appellate jurisdiction as “laws of the 
United States” because the law of nations is not “embodied in any 
provision of the Constitution, nor in any treaty, act of Congress, or any 
authority, or commission derived from the United States.”68 
Similar to The Paquete Habana and Jecker, the Caperton case is too far 
removed temporally from the enactment of Article III to give much 
guidance on whether the founders thought the law of nations was part of 
the laws of the United States for purposes of Article III jurisdiction.  
Rather, the case reflects the developing federal common law in the area 
of international law, a topic explored later in this essay.   The Caperton 
case reflects on the on-going debate about the role of the law of nations 
within the law of the United States and demonstrates that there was no 
consensus on the issue.  These debates, as one can see, have continued 
through today, and will likely continue for several more years to come. 
Perhaps a better source to determine what was on the minds of at 
least some of the founders are the Federalist Papers.  In the Federalist 
No. 80, Alexander Hamilton discusses federal jurisdiction in a fair 
                                                 
64 81 U.S. (14 Wall.) 216 (1871). 
65 The Judiciary Act of 1789 § 25, 1 Stat. 73 provided for Supreme Court appellate 
jurisdiction consistent with U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 2, where there was “drawn in 
question the validity of a statute of, or an authority exercised under any State, on the 
ground of their being repugnant to the constitution, treaties or laws of the United States, 
and the decision is in favour of such their validity.” 
66 Caperton, 81 U.S. at 225. 
67 Id. at 226. 
68 Id. at 228. 
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amount of detail.69  At the very beginning of the paper, he outlines six 
types of cases to which the judiciary authority of the Union ought to 
extend: 
1st, to all those which arise out of the laws of the United 
States, passed in pursuance of their just and 
constitutional powers of legislation; 2d, to all those 
which concern the execution of the provisions expressly 
contained in the articles of the Union; 3d, to all those in 
which the Unites States are a party; 4th, to all those 
which involve the PEACE of the CONFEDERACY, whether 
they relate to the intercourse between the United States 
and foreign nations, or to that between the States 
themselves; 5th, to all those which originate on the high 
seas, and are of admiralty or maritime jurisdiction; and, 
lastly, to all those in which the State tribunals cannot be 
supposed to be impartial and unbiased.70 
After discussing each of these types, Hamilton then examines the draft 
Constitution, in particular Article III, to argue how each provision of the 
draft Constitution fits into the six types of cases he outlined.  He first 
addresses the provision:  “To all cases in law and equity, arising under the 
Constitution and the laws of the United States.”71  He states that this clause 
responds to the “two first classes of causes, which have been 
enumerated, as proper for the jurisdiction of the United States.”72  He is 
clearly referring to the first two of the six types of cases he outlined at the 
beginning of his paper.  The first involves “all those which arise out of 
the laws of the United States, passed in pursuance of their just and 
constitutional powers of legislation.”  Thus, he is clearly referring to laws 
enacted by Congress, and not to a more broad conception of “law” that 
would include the law of nations. 
It is also important to note that Hamilton did not find that the “laws 
of the United States” clause of Article III satisfied his fourth type of 
cases—those involving “the PEACE of the CONFEDERACY, whether they 
relate to the intercourse between the United States and foreign nations.”  
Had he done so, a much stronger argument could be made that “law of 
the United States” did in fact include the law of nations.  Rather, it was 
the provision that all cases involving foreigners, as well as cases 
                                                 
69 THE FEDERALIST NO. 80, at 515–22 (Alexander Hamilton) (E.M. Earle ed., 1937). 
70 Id. at 515. 
71 Id. at 520. 
72 Id. 
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involving treaties, that he believed satisfied the keeping the peace class 
of cases.73  Although the Federalist Papers clearly advocate that the 
federal judiciary should have jurisdiction over cases that might affect 
foreign affairs, nowhere do the Federalist Papers suggest that Article III’s 
“laws of the United States” language was meant to include the law of 
nations. 
Secondly, the founders could have added “law of nations” to Article 
III, but they did not.  This could have been a result of compromise, as 
some federalists were worried that including the law of nations under 
Article III would give too much power to the federal courts.  This 
concern would have been consistent with the concern of the federalists at 
the time.74 
Having said all of this, it is important to keep in mind that Federalist 
Paper No. 80 directly reflects the thinking of one man—Alexander 
Hamilton—or at the most, three men.  It is quite possible that the 
founders knew exactly what they were doing when they removed the 
phrase “passed by the Legislature” from Article III,75 namely, creating 
room for debate.  Every time I read the Federalist Papers, I am struck 
over and over again by the brilliance of the founders, and of their 
political acumen, so this is certainly feasible. 
2. The Founders Likely Did Not Intend Article III’s Reference to “Laws 
of the United States” to Include the Law of Nations 
Upon contemplating Federalist No. 80, the drafting and final 
wording of Article III, the extensive areas in which the founders did 
ensure federal jurisdiction, and the predominate view that the law of 
nations was something like general common law that applied to both the 
federal and state governments, the likely conclusion is that the founders 
did not intend for the “laws of the United States” provision under Article 
III to include the law of nations.  Rather, they attempted to ensure that 
the federal judiciary would have jurisdiction in any case where the law 
of nations might arise, such as cases involving treaties, ambassadors, 
admiralty and maritime, and cases between citizens and foreigners.76 
If the founders did not intend the “laws of the United States” to 
include statutes or the law of nations, and given the fact that a 
recognizable federal common law did not exist at the time, the next 
question becomes this:  Do “laws of the United States,” for purposes of 
                                                 
73 Id. at 517, 521–22. 
74 See Skinner, supra note 59, at 78–83. 
75 Dodge, Bridging Erie, supra note 29, at 102. 
76 See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2. 
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Article III, include modern federal common law, or some aspects of such 
law, that incorporates customary international law, or some aspects of it?  
Similarly, given the fact that Congress, in 1875, likely intended to confer 
jurisdiction to federal courts through enactment of federal question 
jurisdiction, codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1331, to the extent allowed by Article 
III,77 does arising under the “laws of the United States,” contained in the 
language of § 1331, include federal common law which incorporates, or 
at least recognizes, customary international law?  I answer both 
questions in the affirmative. 
3. Article III’s and § 1331’s References to the “Laws of the United 
States” Now Include Federal Common Law, Which Can Include 
Customary International Law 
a. Development of Federal Common Law 
Federal courts began developing their own common law in the 
1800s, around the time of Swift v. Tyson in 1842, and continued doing so 
in areas such as contracts, agency, insurance and torts.78  There was 
criticism of Swift and the federal courts’ development of federal common 
law, reflecting a tension between the rights of state courts to develop and 
apply their own common law in matters of local concern, and the desire 
that certain questions affecting the nation as a whole should be decided 
by federal courts. 79  In fact, federal courts began to develop common law 
in areas unique to federal interests.80  Admiralty, for example, was an 
area where federal courts continued development of federal common 
law.81  However, in each of these situations, the courts were developing 
federal common law in areas over which they already had jurisdiction; 
they were not recognizing federal common law for purposes of 
jurisdiction given the fact that § 1331 was not enacted until 1875. 
The case of Caperton v. Bowyer is perhaps the first example where 
lawyers argued that the law of nations should provide for jurisdiction, 
albeit appellate, based on the language “arising under the laws of the 
United States.”  In Caperton, the defendant argued that the Supreme 
Court should have appellate jurisdiction over his case because it 
involved international law, and that if the Court did not take jurisdiction, 
                                                 
77 See Skinner, supra note 59, at 69–72. 
78 See id. at 39–40. 
79 See, e.g., Stephens, supra note 29, at 430–31. 
80 Id. 
81 See Skinner, supra note 59, at 41.  See also, e.g., The Belgenland, 114 U.S. 355, 365 (1885); 
The Plymouth, 70 U.S. (3 Wall.) 20 (1865); The Lamington, 87 F. 752 (E.D.N.Y. 1898). 
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issues involving foreign relations would be at the mercy of state courts.82  
The plaintiff argued that the law of nations was not federal law and that 
the case did not affect foreign relations.  However, he conceded that 
perhaps the Supreme Court should have appellate jurisdiction over cases 
that could affect foreign relations because that was an area the federal 
government was responsible for.83 
Another case reflecting the emergence of federal common law in the 
area of international law was the 1894 federal district court case, Murray 
v. Chicago & N.W. Ry. Co.84  In Murray, the court held that federal courts 
are empowered to develop common law principles governing “matters 
of national control.”85  The court pointed in particular to international 
law, stating, “[t]he subject-matter of dealing with other nations is 
conferred exclusively upon the national government, and of necessity all 
questions arising under the law of nations . . . are committed to the 
national government.”86  In 1901, the Supreme Court approvingly cited 
Murray in Western Union Telegraph Co. v. Call Publishing Co.,87 where the 
Court held that it had jurisdiction over claims involving pricing and 
applied emerging federal common law to the case. 
In 1875, for the first time, the Supreme Court considered whether a 
claim involving the law of nations presented a federal question for 
appellate jurisdiction and held that it did not.  In New York Life Ins. Co. v. 
Hendren,88 a case involving the effect of the Civil War upon insurance 
contracts, the Court held that no federal question was presented where 
the question rested on the general law of nations unless it was contended 
that the general laws had been “modified or suspended” by the laws of 
the United States.89  The Court treated the question as one of general 
public law available to and applicable in all courts, but not one creating a 
federal question.90 
The opinion drew a vigorous dissent by Justice Bradley, who stated 
that “international law has the force of law in our courts, because it is 
adopted and used by the United States.”91  He continued: 
                                                 
82 Caperton v. Bowyer, 81 U.S. (14 Wall.) 216, 226 (1871); see also supra notes 64–68 
(discussing the Caperton case). 
83 Caperton, 81 U.S. (14 Wall.) at 228–29. 
84 62 F. 24 (C.C.N.D. Iowa 1894).  The case concerned an action to recover damages for 
freight transportation rates.  Id. 
85 Id. at 31–33, 42. 
86 Id. at 32. 
87 181 U.S. 92 (1901). 
88 92 U.S. 286 (1875). 
89 Id. at 286–87. 
90 Id. at 287. 
91 Id. (Bradley, J., dissenting). 
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[T]he laws which the citizens of the United States are to 
obey in regard to intercourse with a nation or people 
with which they are at war are laws of the United States.  
These laws will be the unwritten international law, . . . or 
the express regulations of the government. . . . [I]n both 
cases it is the law of the United States for the time being, 
whether written or unwritten.92 
In his dissent, he also noted the importance of ensuring uniformity 
and that the final word on these types of matters comes from the 
national government.93 
Although the majority in Hendren suggests that the law of nations 
was not jurisdiction-creating, it did not address the issue that federal 
common law might exist in the area of foreign affairs, nor did the 
majority address any issues that it viewed could affect foreign affairs.  
The majority viewed it as a wholly domestic case.  Had the case been one 
that impacted foreign affairs, one wonders if a different result might 
have ensued.  The dissent, however, reflects a continuation of the debate 
regarding the role of international law in domestic law that was 
highlighted in Caperton four years earlier and that still continues today. 
These three cases in particular, in combination with the admiralty 
cases, reflect an emerging strain of thought among lawyers and jurists 
that, in cases involving or impacting foreign affairs, common law of the 
federal courts might appropriately exist, possibly even to create 
jurisdiction.  This developing school of thought grew simultaneously 
with the expansion of federal common law in many areas, as discussed 
earlier. 
The expansion of general federal common law ended with the 1938 
Supreme Court decision of Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins,94 in which the Court 
held that there was no longer general federal common law and that in 
diversity cases, state law should be applied, except in matters governed 
by the Federal Constitution or by acts of Congress.95  However, Erie 
insinuated that certain enclaves of federal common law still existed,96 
and it since has been accepted that international law is one such area. 
                                                 
92 Id. 
93 Id. at 288. 
94 304 U.S. 64 (1938). 
95 Id. at 78. 
96 Id. 
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b. Courts Recognize Aspects of the Law of Nations as an Enclave of Federal 
Common Law that Survived Erie 
Shortly after the decision in Erie, Professor Philip Jessup wrote a 
famous law review article wherein he argued that customary 
international law should be treated as federal law, saying, “[a]ny 
question of applying international law in our courts involves the foreign 
relations of the United States and can thus be brought within a federal 
power. . . .  It would be as unsound as it would be unwise to make our 
state courts our ultimate authority for pronouncing the rules of 
international law.”97 
In the 1964 case Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino,98 the Supreme 
Court applied the Act of State Doctrine as a matter of federal common 
law in dismissing a claim against Cuba by an American commodity 
broker, recognizing that it still had authority to develop a common law 
rule because  of its importance to foreign relations.  In doing so, the 
Court noted that the “United States courts apply international law as a 
part of our own in appropriate circumstances.”99  It further stated: 
[W]e are constrained to make it clear that an issue 
concerned with a basic choice regarding the competence 
and function of the Judiciary and the National Executive 
in ordering our relationships with other members of the 
international community must be treated exclusively as 
an aspect of federal law.  It seems fair to assume that the 
Court did not have rules like the act of state doctrine in 
mind when it decided Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins.100 
The Court also approved Professor Jessup’s proposition that rules of 
international law should not be left to divergent and perhaps parochial 
state interpretations, and that “[Jessup’s] basic rationale is equally 
applicable to the act of state doctrine.”101 
The Sabbatino case is especially important for its consideration of the 
issues addressed in this article.  The case did not directly apply 
                                                 
97 Philip C. Jessup, The Doctrine of Erie Railroad v. Tompkins Applied to International Law, 
33 AM. J. INT’L L. 740, 743 (1939). 
98 Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 427 (1964).  The Act of State 
doctrine dictates that “[e]very sovereign state is bound to respect the independence of 
every other sovereign state, and the courts of one country will not sit in judgment on the 
acts of the government of another, done within its own territory.” Id. at 416 (quoting 
Underhill v. Hernandez, 168 U.S. 250, 252 (1897)). 
99 Sabbatino, 376 U.S. at 423. 
100 Id. at 425 (italics added and footnote omitted). 
101 Id. 
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international law or the law of nations; rather it held that it had the 
authority under the Constitution102 to develop federal common law in 
the area of foreign affairs.  The Court insinuated that there is nothing 
that would prevent the incorporation or recognition of a customary 
international law rule in the development of federal common law; in fact, 
Sabbatino explored international law in deciding whether to adopt the 
Act of State doctrine to the case before it.103 
Similarly, in the 1981 case of Texas Industries, Inc. v. Radcliff Materials, 
Inc., the Supreme Court confirmed that “international disputes 
implicating . . . our relations with foreign nations,” is an area of law that 
continues to exist as an enclave of federal common law.104  The U.S. 
Supreme Court in Sosa agreed.  The Sosa Court recognized that Erie 
allowed “limited enclaves” in which federal courts may derive some 
substantive federal common law.105  The Sosa Court indicated that the 
law of nations, or areas of federal relations, is one such area.106 
c. Courts Have the Authority to Develop Federal Common Law and to 
Recognize Private Claims Where Such Could Impact Foreign Affairs 
As the Court in Texas Industries noted, “[t]he vesting of jurisdiction in 
the federal courts does not in and of itself give rise to authority to 
formulate federal common law.”107  However, according to the Court in 
Texas Industries, courts can create federal common law either where there 
is specific Congressional authorization to do so, or absent such specific 
authorization, where such is “necessary to protect uniquely federal 
interests,” such as those narrow areas “concerned with the rights and 
obligations of the United States,” including “our relations with foreign 
nations.”108  The Court continued: 
In these instances, our federal system does not permit 
the controversy to be resolved under state law, either 
because the authority and duties of the United States as 
                                                 
102 Id. at 423. “The act of state doctrine does, however, have ‘constitutional’ 
underpinnings.  It arises out of the basic relationships between branches of government in 
a system of separation of powers.”  Id. 
103 Id. at 421, 428–29. 
104 Tex. Indus., Inc. v. Radcliff Materials, Inc., 451 U.S. 630, 641 (1981).  See also Sosa v. 
Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 730 (2004) (citing Tex. Indus. with approval). 
105 Sosa, 542 U.S. at 729.  See also id. at 729 n.18 (noting that Sabbatino “further endorsed 
the reasoning of a noted commentator who had argued that Erie should not preclude the 
continued application of international law in federal courts”). 
106 Id. at 729–30. 
107 Tex. Indus., Inc. v. Radcliff Materials, Inc., 451 U.S. 630, 640–41 (1981). 
108 Id. (citing Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 426 (1964)). 
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sovereign are intimately involved or because the 
interstate or international nature of the controversy 
makes it inappropriate for state law to control.109 
Texas Industries makes it clear that even without specific 
Congressional authorization, the creation of federal common law is 
permissible in very narrow areas of federal interest, including any 
decision that might affect foreign affairs.  Thus, federal courts may use 
their common law power to recognize claims for violations of the law of 
nations where the recognition of such claims, or aspects of them, might 
affect foreign relations.  Even where the person bringing a claim for a 
violation of the law of nations is a United States citizen, jurisdiction for 
such claims should fall within the jurisdiction of federal courts, given 
that such claims might impact foreign affairs either through recognition 
of the claim, through a finding that the claim is non-justiciable, or 
through definitions of customary international law. 
A reading of all these cases involving international law and federal 
common law leads to the conclusion that the law of nations, in and of 
itself, is not part of the laws of the United States, rather, the federal 
courts adopt certain rules of customarily international law which become 
federal common law.  Similarly, a fair reading does not lead to the 
conclusion that customary international law is wholly incorporated into 
our federal common law.  This is borne out by the Court in Sosa, which 
found that U.S. federal courts recognize customary international law.110  
In addition, the Court in Sosa made it clear that not all claims for 
violations of customary international law fall under the federal courts 
common law power, only a certain number of them.111  Thus, the Court’s 
language and holding suggests that its view is that our federal common 
law does not wholly incorporate customary international law, but that 
federal courts have the power to recognize some customary international 
law, as well as the power to recognize some claims for violation of 
customary international law. 
The Jecker, The Paquette Habana, Sabbatino, Texas Industries, and Sosa 
cases all suggest that the federal courts have the authority to develop law 
                                                 
109 Id. (citing Illinois v. City of Milwaukee, 406 U.S. 91 (1972); Sabbatino, 376 U.S. at 398 
(1964); Hinderlider v. La Plata River & Cherry Creek Ditch Co., 304 U.S. 92 (1938) (issued 
on the same day as Erie)). 
110 Sosa, 542 U.S. at 729. 
111 See supra note 7, discussing Sosa’s requirement that any claim brought today for a 
violation of the law of nations under the ATS must “rest on a norm of international 
character accepted by the civilized world and defined with specificity comparable to the 
features of the 18th Century paradigms” recognized at the time—attacks on diplomats, safe 
conducts, and piracy.  Sosa, 542 U.S. at 725. 
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in areas of unique federal interests, especially in cases that could affect 
foreign relations, and that courts can look to customary international law 
to supply that law and incorporate it into federal common law.  In fact, 
given the understanding and desire of the founders, federal courts 
should adopt customary international law when appropriate unless 
there are strong national interest reasons not to.  This is true whether a 
court is recognizing a private claim for violations of federal common 
law, as permitted by the Sosa court, or in diversity cases which might 
impact foreign affairs. 
 
4. Modern Federal Common Law as “Law of the United States” for 
Purposes of Article III and 28 U.S.C. § 1331 
As stated in the very beginning of this article, the Supreme Court in 
Illinois v. City of Milwaukee,112 found that “laws of the United States,” 
within the meaning of § 1331, embraces claims founded on federal 
common law.  This strongly implies that claims founded on federal 
common law also meet the “arising under the laws of the United States” 
test for purposes of Article III jurisdiction based on the fact that the 
Supreme Court has found Article III’s grant of jurisdiction broader than 
§ 1331.  Moreover, the fact that the Court did not question the 
constitutionality of the ATS’s applicability between two aliens in Sosa, as 
well as its approval of the Filartiga case, both indicate that the Court has 
taken a similar view. 
Congress itself appears to agree with this view, having explicitly 
based its constitutional power to enact the Torture Victim Protection 
Act113 on the premise that international law is part of the “law of the 
United States” for purposes of Article III jurisdiction, as well as on 
Congress’s authority to “define and punish . . . [o]ffenses against the Law 
of Nations.”114 
5. Claims for a Violation of the Law of Nations Under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 
The fact that § 1331 should embrace claims founded on federal 
common law, and that federal courts have the common law power to 
recognize some claims alleging violation of the law of nations does not in 
                                                 
112 406 U.S. 91, 100 (1972) (citing Romero v. Int’l Terminal Operating Co., 358 U.S. 354, 
393 (1959) (Brennan, J., dissenting in part and concurring in part) (“laws” within the 
meaning of § 1331 embraces claims founded on federal common law)). 
113 See S. COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, REPORT ON THE TORTURE VICTIM PROTECTION ACT OF 
1991, S. 102-249, 1st Sess., at 5 n.2 (1991) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (1988)). 
114 Id. at 6 (citing Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 28 (1942) (internal quotations omitted)). 
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and of itself establish that the courts should recognize private claims 
under § 1331.   
However, just as with the ATS, Congress, upon its enactment of 28 
U.S.C. § 1331, likely understood that federal courts would use their 
common law power to recognize claims, as they had been doing for 
nearly a hundred years.115  Given the growing development of federal 
common law, of which Congress was surely aware, Congress likely 
understood that such claims included claims based on federal common 
law.  Moreover, Sosa confirms that courts can use their federal common 
law power to recognize claims for violations of federal common law in 
appropriate circumstances and stated that “any international norm 
intended to protect individuals” as within this realm.116 
Thus, common law claims for violation of customary international 
law, where such claims could impact foreign affairs, should be 
recognized as federal common law actionable under § 1331. 
                                                 
115 Skinner, supra note 59, at 101–07. 
116 Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 730 (2004). 
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